We set out to shed light on three conundrums that exist in the literature on investment: why do investments out of different sources of finance earn different returns, why do different studies report different patterns of returns, and why do companies in developing countries make greater use of external capital to finance their investment than do companies in developed countries?
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In this article we develop several hypotheses to explain (1) why contradictory to standard neoclassical theory investments out of different sources of finance can earn significantly different rates of return, and (2) why different studies can record such dramatic differences in estimates of returns from the three main sources of finance, internal cash flows, new debt, and new equity.
Our explanations for these differences rest on three assumptions: (1) that firms have different investment opportunities, (2) that managers pursue different objectives when undertaking investments, and (3) that managers are subject to different constraints in their pursuit of these goals. In particular, we shall emphasize the importance of various legal and other institutional constraints on managers that fall under the broad heading of corporate governance structures. 1 In addition to clearing up several questions in the literature regarding returns on investment, we shall also provide at least a partial explanation for a puzzle first documented by Ajit Singh (1994) -the greater use of external finance and in particular, the greater use of equity to finance investment in some developing countries 2 than occurs in the developed countries.
Studies in the United States and United Kingdom, which have tried to explain the strong preference for internal funds to finance corporate investments, have cited factors like transaction costs (Duesenberry, 1958) , asymmetric information (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Myers and Majluf, 1984) , and agency problems (Grabowski and Mueller, 1972) .
But, if the transaction costs of using external capital markets are so high that they prevent firms in developed countries like the United States and Switzerland from investing when they lack the internal cash flows to finance these investments, then one expects cash flow to be an even more important source of finance in developing countries like Mexico and Indonesia, since certainly the transaction costs of raising capital externally must be higher in these developing countries. 3 If external capital markets have difficulty gauging the returns on investment in countries like the United Kingdom and Germany with well-established stock markets and banking sectors, how difficult it must be for the rather undeveloped financial sectors in countries like Pakistan and South Korea to make these evaluations. Nor is it obvious why agency problemsone of the explanations for a hierarchy of finance -should be more serious in the major developed countries of the world, than in developing countries. Singh's finding of greater popularity for external finance in developing countries seems to contradict the various hypotheses about why a hierarchy of finance exists. The hypotheses developed and tested in this article both help to explain the greater use of equity markets to finance investment by some firms in developing countries, and differences in patterns of returns across firms and countries.
In particular, corporate governance institutions appear to be weaker in developing than in developed countries and thus provide less of a check on managers in developing countries who wish to issue equity to finance low return investments. Managers who wish to undertake low return investments in countries with strong corporate governance systems accordingly prefer to rely on internal cash flows to finance these investments, managers making similar investments in countries with weak corporate governance systems are freer to use the equity market as a source of finance. Thus, differences in corporate governance structures will be seen to explain both differences in the sources of finance for investment across countries and differences in the returns on investment.
We proceed as follows: Section I briefly reviews past studies regarding the existence of a hierarchy in returns on investment. The logic underlying our main hypotheses follows in Section II. Section III discusses the methodology used to test these hypotheses. The data used are briefly discussed in Section IV with our main findings presented in Section V. Section VI is devoted to testing hypotheses about the relative importance of different sources of finance across countries.
It is followed by a brief concluding section. 3 
I. Background
A stylized fact in the investment literature is that there exists a hierarchy of finance (Hubbard, 1998) . Firms first resort to internal cash flows to finance their investments, secondly to issuing debt and last of all to the equity market.
Evidence of a similar hierarchy of finance can also be found in the literature measuring the returns on investment. Baumol, Heim, Malkiel and Quandt (1970) (hereafter BHMQ) estimated rates of return on the reinvested cash flows of large US companies in the 1950s and 1960s over a range between 3.0 and 4.6 percent. These estimates were both much lower than the costs of capital for large companies in the 50s and 60s, and than BHMQ's estimates of returns on investment out of new debt and equity issues (see Table 1 ). The ordering of BHMQ's estimates corresponds to that postulated in the hierarchy of finance literature. BHMQ accounted for their low estimates of returns on investment out of cash flows as evidence of the exercise of managerial discretion in the pursuit of growth.
BHMQ's article sparked several subsequent studies. Space precludes a thorough review of this literature, but some comments seem in order. The results for the studies estimating separate returns on different sources of funds are summarized in Table 1 . 4 Friend and Husic (1973) claimed that BHMQ's results were spurious because, for among other reasons, BHMQ measured returns for a sample that included many firms that issued neither debt nor equity. When the sample was restricted to firms issuing debt and equity, differences in the returns out of the three sources of funds disappeared (see Table 1 ). BHMQ (1973) countered by showing that the returns on reinvested cash flows for companies issuing no debt and equity were even lower than their original estimates.
Both Brealey, Hodges and Capron (1976) and McFetridge (1978) rejected BHMQ's conclusion that reinvested cash flows earn lower returns than investments out of other sources of finance, because the differences in returns that they estimated were often not statistically significant. As can be seen in Table 1 , by comparing the midpoints of the ranges of McFetridge's most preferred specification, however, the differences in estimated returns are often economically significant. The lack of statistical significance between these estimated returns is obviously due to the large standard errors associated with each estimate. But this in itself implies both considerable heterogeneity across firms and that some firms in the sample must be earning returns on reinvested cash flows that are substantially below the estimates reported. 5 Where the early literature relied entirely on accounting data, some more recent work employs both accounting and stock market data to estimate returns on investment. This methodology allows one to calculate what is essentially a marginal Tobin's q, namely the ratio of the returns on a company's investment, r, to its cost of capital i. This methodology is employed in this study and is described below. It was developed and first employed by Mueller and Reardon (1993) . Their main finding was that 8 out of 10 of the 699 large US corporations in their sample had returns on investment less than their cost of capital over the period 1969 to 1988. They also estimated returns from different sources of funds ( Table 1) . As did BHMQ, Mueller and Reardon estimated returns on investment out of cash flows far below company costs of capital (r/i = 0.56). In contrast, returns on investment out of new debt issues were both significantly greater than for investments out of cash flows and nearly equal to their costs of capital (r/i = 0.92). Unlike BHMQ's estimates, however, they found significantly lower returns on investment financed through new equity issues than from new debt. This at first surprising result is accounted for below.
The recent study by Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000) comes closest to ours. They employ the Mueller/Reardon methodology to estimate separate marginal qs for countries grouped according to the origins of their legal systems as classified by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (hereafter LLSV) (1997) . As can be seen in Table 1 , the same hierarchy of finance posited in the determinants of investment literature, and observed in BHMQ's estimates of returns on investment, reappears in some, but not all, of the estimates of Mueller and Yurtoglu.
II. Hypotheses
Agency problems can exist in any country. For these problems to manifest themselves as low returns on investment, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) Managers must feel secure enough in their positions to be able to undertake low-return investments without losing their jobs.
(2) They must be able to obtain the funds to finance the investments. The first condition is related to corporate governance structures. Where they align managerial and shareholders' interests ceteris paribus firms will earn higher returns on investment out of all sources of funds.
We shall define a corporate governance system that brings about such an alignment as being strong, and formulate
Hypothesis 1:
In countries with strong corporate governance systems the average q mI > 1, where .
q mI is the ratio of the returns on a company's total investment to its cost of capital.
A weak corporate governance system might simply be defined as the converse to a strong system. Here, however, one must recognize that some firms have attractive investment opportunities in countries with weak corporate governance systems. No conflict over investment policies for these companies may exist, as both the managers and the shareholders wish to see the firm exploit its investment opportunities. Since we test our hypotheses over large groups of countries, however, it seems reasonable to assume that the average firm has normal investment opportunities and, thus, if its managers take advantage of the weakness of its corporate governance system, they will overinvest. This leads to Hypothesis 2: In countries with weak corporate governance systems the average q mI < 1.
We hasten to add, however, that hypothesis 2 is consistent with the existence of individual firms in a country with a weak corporate governance system having a q mI > 1, and even with entire countries with weak corporate governance systems having average q mI s > 1.
We employ two criteria for classifying countries by the strengths of their corporate governance systems -the nature of their legal system and their level of development. LLSV (1997, 1998) have examined the content and historical development of legal institutions in different countries and presented evidence that common law systems offer shareholders greater protection against managerial abuse of their position than do civil law systems. This categorization has also been successfully employed by Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000) in their study of investment performance as already noted. 6 Our first criterion for distinguishing between corporate governance systems is, therefore, by the origin of their legal systems. The countries falling into each category are identified in Table 2 below, where we also present summary statistics for the variables used in this study.
We think that it is also reasonable to assume that holding legal institutions fixed, developing countries have weaker corporate governance systems than do developed countries.
Law enforcement agencies are often underfunded in developing countries, and their personnel more willing to accept bribes. Judges are often poorly trained and paid in developing countries.
For these reasons, we believe that the laws and regulations covering corporate governance will be more vigorously and consistently enforced in developed countries than in developing countries.
Hypothesis 4:
Developed countries have stronger corporate governance systems than developing countries.
The countries, which we categorize as developed and developing, are also identified in Table 2 . Most of these categorizations are uncontroversial. Some might argue, however, that a country with as high of a per capita income as Singapore should no longer be thought of as developing, and for the same reason perhaps that Greece should be. Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea are often referred to as "emerging markets," however, and included in mutual funds of emerging-market countries (Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler, 2001) . We thus are willing to defend our choices on this basis.
As noted at the beginning of this section, to invest in a project with a return less than the firm's cost of capital its managers must not only possess the discretion afforded by a weak corporate governance system, but also the funds to undertake the investment. The allocation of a company's internal cash flows is entirely at the discretion of the managers, and this source of funds will be preferred by managers of firms with q mI < 1. In contradiction to the usual reasoning in the hierarchy of finance literature, however, we hypothesize that the next preferred source of finance for managers investing in low returns projects is equity rather than debt. The decision to issue equity or not lies with the firm's management. Additional funds beyond those available from internal cash flows can always be raised by going into the equity market. In contrast, an application for a loan to a bank may be turned down. Moreover, even if the loan is granted, it will contain specific interest obligations and perhaps include a claim on certain assets of the firm in case it defaults. Debt holders can under certain conditions force firms into bankruptcy. For all these reasons, debt is a much less attractive source of funds for managers making poor investments than either internal cash flows or new equity. Thus, within a sample of companies with q mI < 1, we expect the firms with the lowest returns on investment to favor internal cash flows and new equity as sources of finance. This leads us to Hypothesis 5: For companies with q mI < 1, 1 > q mD > q mCF , and q mD > q mE , where q mCF , q mD and q mE are the marginal qs on reinvested cash flows, new debt and new equity.
We assume that the legal rights of debt holders in all countries are sufficiently strong for hypothesis 5 to hold.
It should be stressed that hypothesis 5 is consistent with both the existence of rational expectations on the part of shareholders, and the purchasers of new equity earning a normal return on their investment. To see this assume that the market expects today's assets for a company to generate a permanent profit stream, π. It has N 0 shares outstanding and a cost of capital of i. Then today's share price, P 0 , must be such that π/i = P 0 N 0 . Now suppose that the firm decides to issue M shares to finance an investment of I, which will earn a return of r, r < i.
Under the efficient capital market assumption, as soon as the company announces its intention to finance this investment its share price falls to P 1 , where (π + rI)/i = P 1 (N 0 + M). The managers of the firm must obviously select M such that P 1 M = I. The purchasers of the newly issued shares will earn a normal return on their purchase, just as the old shareholders will -based on the new, lower share price. The old shareholders will bear all of the capital loss from the managers' decision to invest at an r < i. Of course, the new shareholders must consider that the managers may issue equity again in the future, and thus factor any likely future capital losses into the price they are willing to pay today for the firm's shares. But, so long as the firm pays some dividends now or in the future, there will be a positive share price for shares issued today, and the management can raise funds for investment.
Consider now firms with q mI > 1. Unlike those with q mI < 1, these companies appear to be maximizing shareholder wealth or at least trying to do so. In a frictionless world with a perfect capital market, a firm which maximized its shareholders' wealth would equate its marginal return on investment, mrr I , to its cost of capital, i. Two possible situations are depicted in Figure 1 . On the left is a firm whose optimal level of investment, I*, is less than its internal cash flows, F. This firm issues no debt or equity and pays out F-I* in dividends. The marginal q that we estimate equals the ratio of a firm's return on its total investment, r, relative to its cost of capital, i. The optimal investment for the firm in Figure 1b exceeds its cash flows, and this firm maximizes shareholder wealth by paying no dividends and issuing debt or equity equal to I*-F. If we assume that it issues I*-F in debt, then we have,
In a neoclassical world where the costs of external and internal capital are the same for all forms of capital, I*-F for the firm in Figure 1b might be financed out of new debt or equity, and would be expected to have a lower return than the investment out of cash flow in either case. In the real world, however, the choice between debt and equity can be expected to depend on other factors. Companies with investment opportunities as depicted in Figure 1b are often young firms with potentially attractive investment opportunities, but also often with high risks associated with these investments. These firms may find it difficult to obtain loans from banks, and may be unwilling to constrain their future actions by issuing debt. Entering into the equity market may be the most attractive course of action once all internal cash flows have been exhausted. These considerations lead us to expect both higher mean returns and higher variances around these returns for q mI > 1 firms issuing equity, and thus to Hypothesis 6: For companies with q mI > 1, q mCF > q mD > 1 .
And a bit more tentatively
Hypothesis 7: For companies with q mI > 1, q mE > q mD > 1 .
With the accompanying
Hypothesis 8: For companies with q mI > 1, the variance around q mE exceeds the variance around
The reader will have observed that none of our hypotheses postulates the pattern of returns first observed by BHMQ, q mCF < q mD < q mE . Hypotheses 5-7 imply that such a pattern might be observed, however, in a sample that mixes companies with q mI > 1, and companies with q mI < 1.
If, for example, most companies with q mI < 1 do not issue any debt or equity, while the firms issuing debt and equity tend to have q mI > 1, then the ordering of q mCF and q mD is likely to correspond to hypothesis 5, while the ordering of q mD and q mE matches hypothesis 7. This leads us to formulate Hypothesis 9: When the pattern q mCF < q mD < q mE is observed, it will only be for samples that include companies with both q mI > 1, and q mI < 1.
Hypotheses 5-7 and 9, if confirmed, would account for the somewhat perplexing patterns of returns observed in previous studies estimating separate returns on investments out of different sources of finance (see Table 1 ). It is our contention that the decision to enter the external capital market, the choice between debt and equity and the returns earned on each depend on whether the firm is behaving like the standard firm of neoclassical theory (q mI > 1), or one subject to agency problems (q mI < 1). Although it is possible that the pattern q mCF < q mD < q mE will be observed, whether it is or not will depend on the relative sizes of the two groups of firms and the proportions of companies in each group that do or do not issue debt and equity.
The categorizations "English-origin," developed, etc. encompass a broad range of institutional features that affect corporate governance structures. As a further test of the importance of legal institutions, therefore, we shall examine the impact of three specific types of institutions.
Shareholders should be able to protect themselves better against self-serving managers and to make better decisions regarding the purchase of new equity issues, the better the quality of accounting information at their disposal. The Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (Bavishi, 1993) has ranked a large sample of countries according to the number of desirable pieces of information each country's accounting standards requires to be published. The scale of this index for the countries in our study runs from a low of 36 for Portugal to a high of 83 for Sweden with a median of 64. We have classified any country with a score of 64 or more as having a strong set of accounting standards, with a score of less than 64 as having weak accounting standards.
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Using this classification we shall test Hypothesis 10: In countries with strong accounting standards, q mCF and q mE are higher than in countries with weak accounting standards.
It is possible, of course, that an improvement in equity's performance comes to some extent at the expense of debt holders, and not simply from a reduction of managerial discretion and an improvement in investment performance. We shall also be interested, therefore, in seeing whether strong accounting systems are associated with lower returns on investment financed through new debt issues.
When managers renege on their side of the contractual bargain, investors and creditors must appeal to the courts. A particularly important institutional difference across countries for investors, therefore, concerns the efficacy of a county's legal institutions in enforcing contracts. Knack and Keefer (1995) have constructed using data from Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) an index of the relative degree to which contractual agreements are honored and complications in contracting arise due to language and mentality differences. This index takes on values ranging from 0 to 4, with higher scores for superior quality. In our sample the index runs from a low of 1.66 for Pakistan to a high of 3.59 for Switzerland with a median of 2.54. We have classified countries with a score of 2.54 or more as having strong contract enforceability, with a score of less than 2.54 as having weak enforceability. We shall test Hypothesis 11: In countries with strong contract enforcement, q mCF and q mE are higher than in countries with weak enforcement.
Note that there is no reason to expect strengthened contract enforcement, unlike stronger accounting standards, to favor shareholders over debt holders. Indeed, debt holders are also likely to benefit from strong contract enforcement.
LLSV (1998) have examined the rights of creditors in different countries and ranked them on a scale of one to four, with four representing the strongest rights. Using this index we have classified any country with a score of 3 or 4 as having strong creditor rights, with a score of 1 or 2 as having weak creditor rights.
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We anticipate superior performance on investments made out of new debt issues in countries with strong creditor rights, and possibly poorer performance for investments financed out of cash flows or new equity issues in these countries.
Hypothesis 12:
In countries with strong creditor rights, q mD is higher than in countries with weak creditor rights.
We turn now to a discussion of the methodology used to test these hypotheses.
III. Methodology
Let I t be a firm's investment in period t, CF t+j the cash flow this investment generates in t j + , and i t the firm's discount rate in t. The present value of this investment, PV t , is then ( )
We can then take PV t from (1) and the investment I t that created it, and calculate the ratio of pseudo-permanent return r t to i t , a ratio that we call q mt
If the firm had invested the same amount I t in a project that produced a permanent return r t , this project would have yielded the exact same present value as the one actually undertaken.
The ratio of r t to i t is the key statistic in our analysis. If a firm maximizes shareholder wealth, then it undertakes no investment for which 1 m t q < .
The market value of the firm at the end of period t can be defined as
where t Ç is the depreciation rate for the firm's total capital as evaluated by the capital market, and t ã is the market's error in evaluating M t . Subtracting M t-1 from both sides of (3) and replacing PV t with q mt I t yields
That q mt is a marginal q can easily be seen from (2) and (4) (2) and (4) define the ratio of a company's return on investment to its cost of capital, which is precisely the statistic needed to test hypotheses about agency problems and the effects of corporate governance on investment performance. Second, the procedure for calculating q mt allows for different degrees of risk across companies. The stock market will demand a greater future stream of cash flows from an investment of 100 before it raises the market value of a high risk company by 100, than it demands of a low risk company.
The assumption of capital market efficiency implies that the error term in (4) has an expected value of zero, and thus that equation (3) can be used to estimate both t δ and q mt under the assumption that they are either constant across firms or over time, or both. Dividing both sides of (4) by M t-1 yields
Equation (5) is favored over other possible rearrangements of (4), because it does not involve a lagged dependent variable, and in cross-section regressions is less likely to be subject to heteroscedasticity owing to the deflation of all error terms by M t-1 .
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To estimate (5) we need data on the market value of each firm and its investments. A firm's market value at the end of year t, M t , is defined as the market value of its outstanding shares at the end of t plus the value of its outstanding debt. Since this number reflects the market's evaluation of the firm's total assets, we wish to use an equally comprehensive measure of investment.
Accordingly we define investment as
where CF is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation, D ∆ and E ∆ are funds raised using new debt and equity issues. Since & R D and advertising expenditures ( ADV )
are also forms of investment that can produce "intangible capital" which contributes to a company's market value, we add them to our measure of total investment to obtain a measure of the firm's additions to its total capital.
The marginal qs on reinvested cash flows (q mCF ), new debt (q mD ) and new equity (q mE ) are obtained by substituting I in equation (5) by its components in equation (6) and estimating separate coefficients.
IV. The Data
The financial data are taken from the 1996- Table 2 reports the number of firms, time period coverage and total number of observations for each of the 46 countries, which we group according to the LLSV classification, and for China, nine transition countries and five African countries. It also reports the means and standard deviations of the main variables used in our analysis. The definition of the variables used is detailed in the Appendix.
V. The Relationships between Institutions and Investment Performance

A. The Impact of Strong Corporate Governance
Since our interest is in differences in investment performance across country groups, we first present estimates in which we constrain the coefficients on investment to be the same for all firms in a given country group. The intercept in equation (5) is an estimate of the depreciation rate, the fall in a company's market value in a given year that is expected to occur, if the firm makes no investments. Depreciation rates can be expected to vary across companies depending on the kinds of capital they invest in. To allow for these differences, we assign each company to a two-digit SIC industry, and estimate a separate depreciation rate (intercept) for each industry.
Stock markets are notoriously volatile, and this volatility is likely to reduce the efficiency of our estimates. To remove some of this volatility, therefore, we have measured each variable in each year as a deviation from the sample mean. This adjustment is equivalent to including a set of country-specific time dummies. Table 3 The coefficients on investment have been first estimated by country group in accordance with the legal system schema of LLSV (1997 , Table II ). This grouping allows us to conduct a joint test of hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. The coefficient on investment for the countries with common law (English-origin) legal systems is slightly greater than 1.0 and significantly greater than the coefficient for the civil-law system countries. The average company in a civil-law system country earned a return on its investment that was only 68 percent of its cost of capital.
The second set of estimates of q mI in Table 3 provide a joint test of hypotheses 1, 2 and 4.
Here and throughout the rest of the paper we omit the estimates for depreciation by industry, since they vary almost not at all between regressions. On average companies in developed countries earned a return on investment roughly equal to their cost of capital. On average companies in developing countries earned a return on investment some 23 percent below their cost of capital.
Developed countries appear to have stronger corporate governance systems than developing countries. Within the English-origin countries, on the other hand, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed with or without the USA in the sample. All estimates of q mI for developing and civil-law countries are significantly less than 1.0 in accordance with Hypothesis 2. Since the samples include companies with both q mI > 1 and q mI < 1, it is possible that the pattern q mCF < q mD < q mE is observed as stated in Hypothesis 9, and this pattern is indeed observed in the six samples that include both the English-origin and developed countries, that is in the samples for which the average q mI is usually > 1.
The results in the next four middle columns are for samples with q mI > 1.0. Hypothesis 6 is confirmed in all 11 samples. Our estimates of q mCF always exceed those for q mD for companies with returns on total investment greater than their costs of capital. For these companies with attractive investment opportunities, it would appear that debt is resorted to as a source of finance only after all cash flows have been exhausted and thus the returns on these investments come closer to company costs of capital.
Hypothesis 7 is confirmed in 10 of the 11 samples. Among the companies with returns on total investment greater than their costs of capital, those that resort to the equity market for additional funds appear to have more attractive investment opportunities than those issuing debt in both the developed and the developing English-origin countries, and in the developed, civil-law countries. Only in the developing, civil-law countries is our estimate of q mD > q mE . Indirectly the results for firms with q mI > 1 also confirm Hypothesis 9. In none of the 11 samples do we find the pattern q mCF < q mD < q mE .
The results presented in the last four columns of Table 4 confirm Hypothesis 5 in all 11
samples. Our estimates of q mD always exceed those for both q mCF and q mE for companies with returns on total investment less than their costs of capital. Among this set of companies it is only those with returns on investment that come close to covering their costs of capital which choose to incur additional debt. Those with the lowest returns on invest resort to the equity market, if they choose to raise external capital. The results for firms with q mI < 1 also confirm Hypothesis 9.
We again do not find the pattern q mCF < q mD < q mE in any of the 11 samples.
Hypothesis 8 predicts less variability in returns for firms with q mI > 1, which choose debt as a source of external finance as opposed to those choosing equity. The first two columns in Table 5 confirm this prediction. All nine standard errors of our estimates of q mD are significantly less than for q mE at the one percent level. (Here and throughout the rest of the paper we do not report results omitting the USA, since this omission never changes our conclusions.)
The last six columns in Table 5 report the R 2 s from the regressions run over the different samples that produced the estimates of q m s reported in Table 5 . In addition to describing how well the equations fit the data for each sample, they further confirm our interpretation of the behavior of company managers. When returns on investment are greater than or equal to companies' costs of capital (q mI > 1), their managers appear to be attempting to maximize shareholder wealth. Their marginal returns on investment should equal their costs of capital, and differences in our estimated q m s should reflect differences in infra-marginal returns and should, presumably, vary over a fairly narrow range. In contrast, firms having q mI < 1 appear to suffer from agency problems. The extent of managerial discretion, and the degree to which different managers exploit the discretion that they have, can vary greatly across companies. Thus, we expect and observe a far closer fit to the data for q mI > 1 samples than for q mI < 1 samples. The range of R 2 s for the former is between 0.32 and 0.36 -double the R 2 s for q mI < 1 samples. Table 6 reports the results when the sample is split by legal system, level of development, q mI and the strength of country accounting standards. The number under a coefficient for weak standards is the p-value for a test for a significant difference from 1.0. The coefficient for strong should be added to the corresponding coefficient for weak to obtain our estimate of q m for strong standards. The number under it indicates again the p-value for a test for significance against 1.0.
B. The Impact of Strong Accounting Standards
A boldfaced entry for strong implies a significant difference (5 percent level) from the corresponding coefficient for weak standards.
Perhaps the most striking feature of Table 6 is that there are no entries for weak accounting standards in developed, English-origin countries. All developed, English-origin countries have strong accounting standards. Hypothesis 10 predicts higher returns on investments financed out of either cash flows or new equity in countries with strong accounting standards.
Thirty comparisons of pairs of coefficients on these two variables can be made. In 28 of them the coefficient for a strong-accounting-system country is larger than the corresponding coefficient for a weak-system country, 13 of the 28 differences are significant (5 percent level, one-tailed test).
Only the coefficient on cash flow for all developed countries with strong accounting standards is significantly lower than the corresponding coefficient for weak-system countries.
There is also some indication in Table 6 that the improvement in investment performance that strong accounting standards cause comes in part at the cost of debt holders. As we have seen, when q mI > 1 investments out of all sources of finance earn returns above the costs of capital. For companies in this category, strong accounting standards do not adversely affect debt holders. For companies with q mI < 1, however, all five coefficients on q mD are lower for the countries with strong accounting standards, than for the corresponding weak-standards countries, three times significantly so. These results imply that the quality of accounting standards can have a significant impact on both a country's returns investment, and how these returns are shared by equity and debt holders. Table 7 presents results controlling for differences in the strength of contract enforcement across countries. The table should be read in exactly the same way as Table 6 . Again the first thing that is apparent are missing entries in two columns. No developed, English-origin country has weak contract enforcement. No developing, civil-law country has strong contract enforcement. These missing entries in Tables 6 and 7 go a long way toward explaining the differences in investment performance across the different groups of countries.
C. The Impact of Strong Contract Enforcement
For 21 of the possible 24 comparisons of coefficients on cash flow and new equity, the coefficient is higher where contract enforcement is strong, 13 of these 21 differences are significant. In none of the three cases where the coefficient on the strong variable is negative is the difference from the coefficient for weak enforcement statistically significant. Hypothesis 11 receives strong support. As noted above, debt holders should not be harmed by stronger contract enforcement and might be helped. There is some indication in Table 7 that this is also the case.
Only one difference between the coefficients on new debt for the strong and weak enforcement countries is significant -and it is positive.
It is also worth emphasizing that the differences associated with strong accounting standards and contract enforcement are often not only statistically significant, but also economically significant. For example, while the returns on investment out of cash flows for the full sample of developing countries with weak accounting standards averaged only 39 percent of company costs of capital, in developing countries with strong standards they exceeded the costs of capital (see Table 6 ).
D. The Impact of Strong Creditor Rights
In Table 8 the results are presented controlling for differences in creditor rights. The table can again be read as with Table 6 . Again we find some missing entries, but interestingly enough, they are in the weak row for the developing countries of English origin . All developing countries with English-origin legal systems have strong creditor rights.
The estimates of q mD in the first four columns are all equal to or greater than 1.0, and thus there is not much scope for improvement and no significant increases in the coefficient on q mD are observed. Only one significant increase occurs in the last two columns (developed, civil-law countries). The results for the developed, common-law countries are also interesting, however.
The coefficient on q mD is not significantly different between the countries with strong and weak creditors' rights. The coefficient on q mE is significantly lower for the countries with strong creditors' rights, however. One gets the impression from these results that the existence of strong creditor rights in English -origin countries leads those firms wishing to make poor investments to make greater use of the equity market. We shall test this conjecture in the next section.
VI. The Relationships between Corporate Governance and the Sources of Finance
The results in Tables 3-8 lend strong support for the 12 hypotheses put forward in Section II. In formulating and testing these hypotheses, we have focused on predictions about the returns from investments out of different sources of finance. The reasoning leading up to these hypotheses has implications, however, not only with respect to the returns on investment, but with respect to the choice of sources of funds. It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a full model of these choices, but before closing we shall test three additional hypotheses that follow directly from our analysis.
Hypothesis 3 asserts that strong corporate governance systems constrain managers from undertaking low return investments. Even within countries with strong corporate governance systems managers have some discretion to undertake low return investments, particularly when they are able to finance them out of their internal cash flows. The greater information available to shareholders and means for disciplining managers in these countries should make the issue of new equity to finance low return projects rather unattractive. We therefore predict that companies resorting to the equity market in countries with strong corporate governance systems tend to have attractive investment opportunities. Defining / E I ∆ as the fraction of total investment financed through new equity, we have
Hypothesis 13:
In countries with strong corporate governance systems, / E I ∆ is higher for companies with q mI > 1 than for companies with q mI < 1.
In countries with weak corporate governance systems, on the other hand, managers have more discretion to pursue their objectives using both new equity issues and internal cash flows.
For the reasons given in Section II, we expect debt to be a less attractive source of external finance than equity for managers of firms with q mI < 
VII. Conclusions
We set out in this paper to shed light on three conundrums in the investment literature:
why investments out of different sources of finance earn different returns, why different studies report different patterns of returns, and why companies in developing countries make greater use of external capital to finance their investment than do companies in developed countries. Our answer to the first question rests in part on the assumption that firms have different investment opportunities, and part on the assumption that managers face different constraints when pursuing their own goals via their investment policies. In particular, managers who wish to undertake low return investments in countries with strong corporate governance systems prefer to rely on internal cash flows to finance these investments, managers making similar investments in countries with weak corporate governance systems are freer to use the equity market as a source of finance. At the same time we postulated that managers with very attractive investment opportunities will often favor equity over debt as a source of external capital. These considerations help explain why investments financed in different ways can exhibit significantly different rates of return.
We made quite different predictions as to the patterns of returns on investments out of the three sources of finance depending on whether a firm's returns on its total investment exceed or fall short of its cost of capital. When q mI < 1 we expect investments financed by new debt to earn the highest returns. When q mI ≥ 1 they should earn the lowest returns. Both predictions were largely confirmed. The confirmation of these two sets of predictions accounts for the differences in findings in previous studies. When companies with q mI > 1 and with q mI < 1 are both included in a sample, the pattern of results depends on the fractions of each in the sample and their relative use of internal and external sources of funds. As postulated in Hypothesis 9 and confirmed in our results, the pattern q mCF < q mD < q mE can be observed only for samples containing companies with q mI > 1 and with q mI < 1 as was true for both the BHMQ and Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000) studies.
Mueller and Reardon (1993) did not observe this pattern for a sample containing companies with q mI > 1 and q mI < 1, but 8 out of 10 companies in their sample had a q mI < 1, and thus it came close to fulfilling the premise of Hypothesis 5, and accordingly its pattern of returns matched the predictions of this hypothesis.
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Finally, our results help to explain why some companies in developing countries make more use of the equity market than do companies in developed countries. Corporate governance institutions appear to be weaker in developing than in developed countries and thus provide less of a check on managers in developing countries who wish to issue equity to finance low return investments.
In closing it is perhaps worth pointing out exactly what our findings do and do not imply.
First, they do not imply that countries with weak corporate governance systems will necessarily exhibit poor economic performance measured in terms, say, of growth rates in income per capita.
Many developed countries in civil-law-system countries like Germany, Italy and Japan had impressive growth rates over much of the post-World War II period, as did developing countries like Korea and Indonesia. As we have emphasized, when companies have attractive investment opportunities, conflicts between owners and managers over investment policies are less likely to arise, and agency problems will not hurt company and by implication macroeconomic performance. Now that Japan, Germany and Italy have rebuilt their economies and "caught up" to the United States, however, their investment opportunities are less attractive than before. The kind of misallocation of investment funds that our results highlight might be a hindrance to future growth in these countries.
One of the consequences of having a weak corporate governance system is that a country tends to have a thin equity market (Modigliani and Perotti, 1997) . Our results regarding investment performance are thus a better indicator of how the US economy performs than, say of Italy, since a far smaller fraction of Italian companies are listed on the Milan stock exchange and 26 thus included in our sample than is the case for US companies. This observation raises in turn the question of whether large equity markets contribute positively to a country's economic performance. Recent work by Levine and Zervos (1998) , Rajan and Zingales (1998) , and
Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) linking economic growth to the size of a country's capital market suggests that they do. If weak corporate governance systems lead to thin equity markets, which in turn lead to slower economic growth, then countries which strengthened their corporate governance systems could anticipate improved investment and growth performance.
While one would not expect a country to revamp its entire legal system to achieve better investment performance, our results suggest that more modest reforms like stronger accounting standards and better enforcement of contracts can have a significant impact on performance.
Such reforms should be feasible for both developed and developing countries regardless of the origins of their legal system. The variables (CS data item numbers in parentheses) are as follows. The market value is defined to be the sum of the market value of common stock, the book value of total debt and preferred stock. The market value of common stock is the end-of-fiscal year number of shares (54) multiplied by the end-of-fiscal year price per share (199) . We use the book value of total debt (9+34) instead of its market value. An accurate estimate of the market value of a firm's outstanding debt obligations requires knowledge not only of the associated coupon and maturity structure but also of the credit quality of each component. Because such information is not available from standard data sources, we use the book values. The preferred stock is taken to be, in order and as available, redemption value (56), liquidating value (10), or par value (130). The investment of a firm in year t is meant to represent all funds available to the company, which could have been paid out directly to shareholders but were instead retained. Thus, investment in year t is defined as
where IB (18) is income before extraordinary items (profits after taxes and interest), DEP (14) is accounting depreciation and DIV (21) is total dividends paid in the fiscal year. These come directly from the annual income statements of each company. New debt (aD) is derived by taking the change in total debt since the previous period. Net new equity (aE ) is calculated as sales (108) 
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Advertising expenses (45) are not reported on GV database. For all countries (except for USA and Canada) these are proxied using aggregate advertising-to-sales ratios at the 4-digit SIC code level from a recent study by Rogers and Tokle (1993) 
